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APR 26 1959

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Dear Mr. Gray:

NAD 901068  
S.H.R. M/Sgt. 1628/31

In response to your memorandum of April 20, 1959, the Departments of State and Defense have compared the disarmament provisions in the proposed Phased Plan on German Reunification, European Security and Berlin, with the provisions of the August 29, 1957 Western disarmament proposals (TAB A).

The principal effect of the Phased Plan on the 1957 disarmament policy is that two elements of the 1957 disarmament package, which was approved as an inseparable package have been incorporated into the Phased Plan. These two elements are:

- (1) "The Limitation and Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments." (Section I, August 1957 Disarmament Proposals.) In order that the Phased Plan include limitation of the armed forces and armaments of the USSR as well as Germany and other European countries, we have incorporated virtually all of Section I of the August 29, 1957 proposals on "The Limitation and Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments." We have not included provision for reductions beyond the third step specified in the 1957 disarmament proposals. The only other difference is that in the Phased Plan more "progress toward the settlement of political issues" would be required at each stage of reduction than is prescribed in the August 29, 1957 proposals.
- (2) "Safeguards Against the Possibility of Surprise Attack." (Section VII, August 1957 Disarmament Proposals.) The Phased Plan contains the following general provisions on surprise attack: "As agreed by the Four Powers and other states concerned, measures of inspection and observation, helped by such technical devices as overlapping radar systems, could be undertaken in Europe, the Arctic area, and Siberia and the North American continent." (We interpret Europe as used in the preceding quote as including the USSR.) This provision is less explicit

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The Honorable  
Gordon Gray,  
Special Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs.

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than Section VII of the 1957 disarmament package, which specifies the areas in which "surprise attack safeguards" are to be applied.

It is the view of the Departments of State and Defense that the inclusion of these two elements as an integral part of the Phased Plan will be advantageous to the Western negotiating position on German reunification and that in the context of the Phased Plan the withdrawal of the two elements from the 1957 disarmament package is acceptable.

The Department of Defense concurs.

Sincerely yours,

/S/ CHRISTIAN A. HERTER

Christian A. Herter

Enclosure:

Tab A - Effect of Phased  
Plan Security Provision

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APR 28 1959

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

April 20, 1959

14573 ~~for Sec Def~~

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MEMORANDUM FOR: ✓The Acting Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense

The President, when I met with him last Thursday, requested that the Departments of State and Defense prepare for his consideration a comparison of the disarmament provisions in the proposed "Phased Plan" on German reunification, European security and Berlin, with the provisions of the August 1957 Western disarmament package proposal. It was my understanding that the President wished a clear and comprehensive presentation which would identify any ways in which the "Phased Plan" would differ from or modify the policy which he approved in 1957, taking into account the President's subsequent decision regarding nuclear testing.

I will be happy to discuss the nature of and arrangements for the above-mentioned presentation to the President with you or your designated representatives as soon as convenient. While the President did not set a specific date for the presentation, I assume it should be done before the Western Foreign Ministers' Meeting scheduled for April 29.

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Gordon Gray  
Special Assistant to the President

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August 29, 1957, Geneva

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~~Subject of United Plan on August 29, 1957~~

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I. The Limitation and Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments.

A. Within one year from the entry into force of the convention, the following States will restrict or reduce their armed forces respectively to the maximum limits indicated below:

Power	750,000
United Kingdom	750,000
Soviet Union	2,750,000
United States	2,750,000

The definition of the armed forces will be annexed to the convention.

B. During this same period, those States will place in storage depots, within their own territories, and under the supervision of an International Control Commission, specific quantities of designated types of armaments to be agreed upon and set forth in lists annexed to the convention.

C. The relation of other States to the convention, including the agreed levels of their armed forces, will be determined later.

D. The States listed in paragraph I A will be prepared to negotiate on a further limitation of their armed forces and armaments upon condition that:

1. Compliance with the provisions of the convention has been verified to their satisfaction.

I. This document consists of \_\_\_\_\_ pages.  
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A. Shared Plan provides under Stage II, para 15: "The Four Powers will restrict or reduce their armed forces to the following maximum limits: United Kingdom 750,000; France 750,000; United States 2,750,000; Soviet Union 2,750,000."

~~Comment:~~ Provision opposite is included in Shared Plan.

B. Shared Plan provides under Stage IX, para 15 that: "During this same period, those states will place in storage depots, within their own territories, and under the supervision of an international control organization, specific quantities of designated types of armaments to be agreed upon and set forth in lists annexed to the agreement."

~~Comment:~~ Provision opposite is included in Shared Plan.

C. Comment: Provision is included in Shared Plan. See para 16 (b) cited under D, below.

D. Shared Plan provides under Stage II that:  
"16. The Four Powers will be prepared to negotiate on a further limitation of their armed forces and armaments to become effective in Stage III subject to:

(a) verification of compliance with the provisions of para 15 above;

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August 21, 1957, Proposals

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2. There has been progress toward the solution of political issues.

3. Other essential states have become parties to the convention and have accepted levels for their armed forces and armaments, fixed in relation to the limits set out in paragraphs A and B above.

4. Upon the conditions cited above, negotiations could be undertaken by France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States on a further limitation of their armed forces which would involve agreed reductions for the United States and the Soviet Union to not less than 2.1 million men each. The agreed level of forces for France and the United Kingdom, corresponding to this figure, would be 700,000 men each. The levels of other essential states would be specified at the same time through negotiation with them.

5. Thereafter, and subject to the same conditions, negotiations could be undertaken on further limitations to not less than 1.7 million men each for the United States and the Soviet Union. The agreed level corresponding to this figure for France and the United Kingdom would be 670,000 men each. The levels of other essential states would be specified at the same time through negotiations with them.

Effect of Phased Plan on August 29, 1957  
Provisions

(b) agreement by other essential states to accept limits on their armed forces and armaments, fixed in relation to the limits of the armed forces and armaments of the Four Powers; and

(c) installation of an inspection and control system to verify compliance with all agreed security measures."

*Comment:* Provision opposite remains valid. Acceptance of Phased Plan is conditional on German reification, thus implying "progress toward the solution of political issues".

2. The Phased Plan provides under Stage III, para 30, that "Providing that the limitations and conditions set forth on armed forces and armaments in Stage II are met the Four Powers will further limit their armed forces to the following levels: France 700,000; U.K., 700,000; U.S., 2,100,000; and USSR, 2,100,000. Reductions in the armed forces and armaments of other essential states to agreed levels would take place at the same time in accordance with para 16 of Stage II."

*Comment:* Provision opposite is included in Phased Plan.

3. The Phased Plan provides under Stage III, para 31, that: "After verified compliance with the above limitations, and subject to the same conditions, negotiations would be undertaken on further limitations to not less than: France 670,000; U.K., 650,000; U.S. 1,700,000; and USSR 1,700,000. The agreed level of other essential states would be specified at the same time through negotiations with them."

*Comment:* Provision opposite is included in Phased Plan.

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August 29, 1977, Paris

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~~Effect of General Plan on August 29, 1977~~

~~Supplementary~~

C. Upon the conditions cited in D above, these States will also be prepared to negotiate on further limitations of armaments. The calculation of any such armament limitations will be in general relation to the armed forces determined in paragraphs I and Y above and will be completed prior to the application of the further limitations in armed forces. The parties must be satisfied before such further limitations of armaments are undertaken and at all times thereafter that the armaments at the disposal of any party to the convention do not exceed the quantities thus allowed in each category.

D. No measures for the reduction and limitation of armed forces and armaments beyond those provided for in paragraphs A and B above will be put into effect until the system of control is appropriately expanded and is able to verify such measures.

### II. Military Expenditure

In order to assist in verifying compliance with the provisions of paragraph I, and having regard to the reduction of military expenditures, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States agree to make available to the International Control Organization information about their military budgets and expenditures for the year preceding entry of the convention into force and for each year thereafter. The categories of information to be supplied will be agreed in advance and annexed to the convention.

### III. Nuclear Weapons

Each party assumes an obligation not to use nuclear weapons if an armed attack has not placed the party in a situation of individual or collective self-defense.

E. General: Provision opposite has no counterpart in General Plan.

F. General: Provision opposite remains valid and applies to comparable measures in the Phased Plan. See paragraph 16 (e) quoted opposite D above.

### III.

Provision opposite has no counterpart in General Plan.

III. Provision opposite has no counterpart in Phased Plan.

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August 29, 1971, Geneva.

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IV. The Control of Plutonium Material

A. The parties to the convention further undertake:

1. That all future production of plutonium materials will be used at home or abroad, under international supervision, exclusively for non-weapons purposes, including stockpiling, beginning one month after the International Board of Control described in paragraph VIII has certified that the installation of an effective inspection system to verify the commitment has been completed.
2. That they will cooperate in the prompt installation and in the maintenance of such an inspection system.
3. That for the purpose of accomplishing the above undertakings, the five Governments represented on the Sub-Committee will appoint a group of technical experts to meet as soon as possible to design the required inspection system, and to submit a program report for their approval within the first ten months after the entry into force of the convention.
4. The parties which are producers of plutonium material for weapons purposes at the time of conclusion of production for weapons purposes undertake to provide, under international supervision, for systematic transfer, in successive shipments, of plutonium materials from previous production to non-weapons purposes, at home or abroad, including stockpiling; and, in this connection:

1. To fix the specific ratios of quantities of plutonium materials of comparable analysis to be transferred by each of them, and
2. To commence such transfers at agreed dates and in agreed quantities at the fixed ratios following the earliest date for production of plutonium materials for weapons purposes.

REPORT OF PLUTONIUM PLAN ON AUGUST 29, 1971

XV.

1. Provisions opposite have no counterpart in Plutonium Plan.

2. Provisions opposite have no counterpart in Plutonium Plan.

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January 49, 1971. Preamble

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C. From the date of the cessation of production of fissile material for weapons purposes provided in paragraph IV A 1:

1. Each party undertakes not to transfer out of its control any nuclear weapons, or to accept transfer to it of such weapons, except where, under arrangements between transferor and transferee, their use will be in conformity with paragraph III.
2. Each party undertakes not otherwise to transfer out of its control any fissile material or to accept transfer to it of such material, except for non-weapons purposes.

#### V. Nuclear Weapons Testing.

A. All parties to the convention undertake to refrain from conducting nuclear test explosions for a period of twelve months from the date of entry into force of the convention, provided that agreement has been reached on the installation and maintenance of the necessary controls, including inspection posts with scientific instruments, located within the territories of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, the area of the Pacific Ocean and at such other places as may be necessary, with the consent of the governments concerned.

B. A group of technical experts appointed by the five Governments represented on the Sub-commission will meet as soon as possible to design the inspection system to verify the suspension of testing.

C. Upon termination of the twelve months period, the parties will be free to conduct tests unless they have agreed to continue the suspension for a further period under effective international supervision.

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Effect of Phased Plan on August 27, 1971  
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C. Provisions opposite have no counterpart in Phased Plan.

v.

A. Provision opposite has no counterpart in Phased Plan.

B. Provision opposite, has no counterpart in Phased Plan.

C. Provision opposite, has no counterpart in Phased Plan.

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August 29, 1957, Parisienne

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Effect of Planned Plan on August 29, 1957  
PROVISIONS

D. If the inspection system referred to in paragraph V A is operating to the satisfaction of each party concerned and if progress satisfactory to each party concerned is being achieved in the preparation of an inspection system for the cessation of the production of fissile material for weapons purposes agreed to under paragraph IV A 1 above, all parties to the convention undertake to refrain from conducting nuclear test explosions for a further period of twelve months. Such an extension will be made only with the understanding that testing may at the discretion of each party be conducted twenty-four months after the entry into force of the convention if the inspection system for the cessation of production for weapons purposes has not been installed to the satisfaction of each party concerned before the end of the twenty-four months and if the cessation of production for weapons purposes has not been put into effect.

E. If tests are resumed, each party undertakes to measure and register in advance the date of each test and the range of total energy to be released therefrom to provide for limited observation of them and to limit the amount of radioactive material to be released into the atmosphere.

#### VI. The Control of Objects Entering Outer Space

All parties to the convention agree that within three months after the entry into effect of the convention they will cooperate in the establishment of a technical committee to study the design of an inspection system which would make it possible to ensure that the sending of objects through outer space will be exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes.

D. Provision opposite, has no counterpart in Planned Plan.

E. Provision opposite has no counterpart in Planned Plan.

VI.

Provision opposite has no counterpart in Planned Plan.

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August 29, 1957 Proposals

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VII. Safeguards Against the Possibility of Surprise Attack

A. From the entry into force of the convention the parties concerned will cooperate in the establishment and maintenance of systems of inspection to safeguard against the possibility of surprise attack.

B. The establishment of such systems will be subject to agreement on the details of its installation, maintenance and operation. It is proposed as a matter of urgency that a working group of experts appointed by the five Governments represented on the Sub-Committee be set up at once to examine the technical problems and to report their conclusions which could form the basis for an annex to the agreement.

C. With regard to inspection in the Northern Hemisphere and in the Soviet Union the Governments of Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States propose the following:

1. That all the territory of the continental United States, all Alaska including the Aleutian Islands, all the territory of Canada and all the territory of the Soviet Union will be open to inspection.

2. If the Government of the Soviet Union rejects this broad proposal, to which is related the proposal for inspection in Europe, referred to in paragraph D below, the Governments of Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States (with the consent of the Governments of Denmark and Norway) propose that:

All the territory north of the Arctic Circle of the Soviet Union, Canada, the United States (Alaska), Denmark (Greenland), and Norway; all the territory of Canada, the United States and the Soviet Union west of 140 degrees West longitude, east of 160 degrees East longitude and north of

Effect of Phased Plan on August 29, 1957  
Proposals

VII. Phased Plan includes the following language under Stage II, paragraph 17: "As agreed by the Four Powers and other states concerned, measures of inspection and observation against surprise attack could be undertaken in Europe, the Arctic area, and Siberia and the North American Continent."

Comment: The specifics of the provisions opposite (A-1) have no counterpart in the Phased Plan.

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50 degrees North latitude; all the remainder of Alaska; all the remainder of Kamchatka peninsula; and all of the Aleutian and Kurile Islands will be open to inspection.

D. With regard to inspection in Europe, provided there is commitment on the part of the Soviet Union to one of the two foregoing proposals, the Governments of Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the concurrence in principle of their European allies and in continuing consultation with them, subject to the indispensable consent of the countries concerned and to any mutually agreed exceptions, propose that an area including all of Europe, bounded in the north by latitude 60 degrees North and in the west by 10 degrees West longitude and in the east by 60 degrees East longitude will be open to inspection.

E. If the Government of the Soviet Union rejects this broad proposal, then, under the same provisions expressed above, a more limited zone of inspection in Europe could be discussed but only on the understanding that this would include a significant part of the territory of the Soviet Union, as well as the other countries of Eastern Europe.

F. The system of inspection to guard against surprise attack will include in all cases aerial inspection, with ground observation posts at principal ports, railway junctions, main highways, and important airfields, etc., as agreed. There would also, as agreed, be mobile ground teams with specifically defined authority.

G. Ground posts may be established by agreement at points in the territories of the States concerned without being restricted to the limits of the zones described in paragraphs C 1 and 2, but the areas open to ground inspection will not be less than the areas of aerial inspection. The mobility of ground inspection

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would be specifically defined in the agreement within all cases the consequences of the countries directly concerned. There would also be all necessary means of communication.

H. Within three months of the entry into force of the convention, the parties will provide to the Board of Control inventories of their fixed military installations, and numbers and locations of their military forces and designated armaments, including the means of delivering nuclear weapons located within an agreed inspection zone or zones, and within such additional areas or areas as may be agreed.

I. Any initial system of inspection designed to safeguard against the possibility of surprise attack may be extended by agreement of all concerned to the end that ultimately the system will deal with the danger of surprise attack from anywhere.

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August 29, 1957 Provisions

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VIII. The International Control Organization

- A. All the obligations contained in the convention will be conditional upon the continued operation of an effective international control and inspection system to verify compliance with its terms by all parties.
- B. All the control and inspection services described in the convention and those which may be created in the course of its implementation will be within the framework of an International Control Organization established under the aegis of the Security Council, which will include, as its executive organ, a Board of Control in which the affirmative vote of the representatives of the Governments represented on the Sub-Committee and of such other parties as may be agreed will be required for important decisions.
- C. All parties to the convention undertake to make available information freely and currently to the Board of Control to assist it in verifying compliance with the obligations of the convention and in categories which will be set forth in an annex to it.
- D. The functions of the International Control Organization will be expanded by agreement between the parties concerned as the measures provided for in the convention are progressively applied.

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Effect of Phased Plan on August 29, 1957  
Provisions

VIII.

- A. Provision opposite has no counterpart in Phased Plan.
- B. Provision opposite has no counterpart in Phased Plan.
- C. Provision opposite has no counterpart in Phased Plan.
- D. The Phased Plan provides under Stage II, para. 20, that: "Inspection Systems would be worked out for ensuring compliance with the appropriate security measures envisaged in Stage III."

Also, in Stage IX, para. 33 provides that: "All of the security measures of the Phased Plan would continue in force as long as the control system is operative and effective and the security provisions are being fulfilled and observed."

Comment: Provision opposite is covered in Phased Plan.

August 22, 1957 Proposals

*CONFIDENTIAL*

2. Other matters relating to the Organization will be defined in annexes to the convention. These matters will include the duties which the Organization is to carry out, the method by which it shall function, its composition, its relationship to the General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations, its voting procedures, its working conditions, jurisdiction, immunities, and prerogatives.

### X. Movement of Armaments

In addition to other rights and responsibilities, the Board of Control will have authority to study a system for regulating the export and import of controlled armaments.

### XI. Suspension of the Convention

A. Each party will have the right to suspend its obligations, partially or completely, by written notice to the International Control Organization, in the event of an important violation by another party, or other action by any state which so prejudices the security of the non-signing party as to require partial or complete suspension.

B. At its option a party may give advance notice of intention to suspend its obligations, in order to afford opportunity for correction of the violations or prejudicial action.

XII. This working paper is offered for negotiation on the understanding that its provisions are incompatible. Failure to fulfill any of the provisions of the convention would create a situation calling for consultation at the request of any party.

Notes of Board Plan on August 22, 1957 Proposals

K. Provision opposite has no counterpart in Planned Plan.

IX. Provision opposite has no counterpart in Planned Plan.

I.

A. Provision opposite has no counterpart in Planned Plan.

B. Provision opposite has no counterpart in Planned Plan.

XI. Provision opposite has no counterpart in the Planned Plan although it incorporates two elements of the 1957 disengagement proposals which were approved as an incompatible position. The disengagement provisions included in the Planned Plan (See I and VII above) are incompatible linked in acceptance of the plan for German reunification and Berlin.

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NOTE: The Phased Plan contains the following additional security measures, which have no counterpart in the August 29, 1957, disengagement package:

STAGE I:

Para. 2. "The Four Powers would establish suitable arrangements for consultation among the parties to implement the security measures provided for in the agreements."

Para. 3. "In a common declaration, with which other interested European states would be invited to associate themselves, they would undertake to:

"(a) settle, by peaceful means, any international dispute in which they may be involved with any other party;

"(b) refrain from the use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations;

"(c) withhold assistance, military or economic, to an aggressor."

Para. 6. The Four Powers would arrange discussions to develop procedures for exchanging information in Stage II on military forces in all Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, and possibly Hungary."

STAGE II:

Para. 14. "An exchange of information on military forces in all of Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, and possibly Hungary, would be undertaken."

Para. 18. "Upon establishment of an effective inspection system, the prohibition of the manufacture of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, now accepted by the Federal Republic, would be extended to cover all of Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, and possibly Hungary."

STAGE III:

Para. 27. "Upon the establishment of an all-German Government, and at the same time as agreement is reached in accordance with Paragraph 26, below, on over-all ceilings, the U.S., U.K., France and the GDR would also agree that in the territories of a reunified Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and possibly Hungary, an agreed balance would be established between the non-indigenous forces of both sides, on condition that, after conclusion of the Peace Treaty, no party would station forces in any country in that zone without the consent of the country involved and, upon the request of that country, would withdraw its forces within a stated period and would undertake the obligation not to send forces to that country."

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again without the consent of its government."

Para. 28. "Upon the establishment of the all-German government, agreed ceilings for the total forces of a reunified Germany and the total forces of Poland and Czechoslovakia, and possibly Hungary, would be put into effect."

Para. 29. "Should the all-German Government decide to adhere to any collective security pact:

"(a) there might be special measures relating to the disposition of military forces and installations in the areas which lie closest to the frontiers between a reunited Germany and countries which are members of another security pact;

"(b) the Four Powers would be prepared to join with other parties to European security arrangements in additional mutual obligations, covering especially the obligation to react against aggression;

"(c) the Four Powers would be prepared to join with other parties to European security arrangements herein described in giving an assurance that they would not advance their forces beyond the former line of demarcation between the two parts of Germany."

Para. 31. "All of the security measures of the Phased Plan would continue in force as long as the central system is operative and effective and the security provisions are being fulfilled and observed."

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